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INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, the Philippines
experienced a handful of companies that were
alleged to have committed accounting fraud.
Examples of these companies include the BW
Resources Corporation, Urban Bank and Legacy
Group. Some of these companies were proven
guilty that resulted to many of their top manage-
ment to be imprisoned. However, by the time the
top officials and other people responsible for the
fraud got convicted, they had already caused serious
problem and damage to their employees, investors
and the public, in the form of lost pensions and
lost funds, as well as the rapid and significant
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This study determines the relationship between the impairment decision, as well as its magnitude, and two earnings management motivations,
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impairment magnitude. The findings show that publicly listed companies in the Philippines are engaging in “income smoothing” and “big bath”
accounting with the use of impairment. Results also indicate that most “big bath” happens during periods where changes in the company’s execu-
tive officers occur. Lastly, there is also evidence that financially strong companies are deferring their impairment recognition to obtain a lower cost of
financing.
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decline in stock price.
Although there are many ways to perpetuate
fraud, one of the easiest and most common ways is
through the use of accounting discretions. In the
past, there are numerous accounting flexibility that
gives an opportunity to manage corporate earnings.
Fortunately, as a result of the many whistle blowers
that revealed companies taking advantage of these
accounting discretions, accounting regulatory
bodies amended the standard with the intention of
eliminating the capacity of management to manage
earnings. Therefore, there is less management
subjec-tivity in the current standard than before.
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Unfortunately, despite of the minimal subjectiv-
ity provided by the standard, some companies are
still able to take advantage of it to manage their
earnings. Although some people may say its effect
in the financial statements is minimal, yet the
reward of these “small” adjustments is large. One of
the easiest, cheapest, and popular ways of earnings
management through the use of accounting discre-
tion is the impairment decision. Consequently,
many theoretical and empirical studies have been
conducted on the said field from different coun-
tries. However, despite the popularity of the topic
to researchers, no study has yet been conducted as
to the factors that contribute to the impairment
decision in the Philippines.
This study sought to validate whether the factors
that signal impairment in the US and UK market
also apply in the Philippine setting. Since impair-
ment is recognized when the carrying amount of
the asset exceeds the higher between fair value less
cost to sell and its value in use, management may
prevent the recognition of impairment by increas-
ing the estimate on future cash flow or by using a
low discount rate, in order to achieve the specific
agenda. This prevents additional expenses from
being recognized in the company’s income state-
ment, thus resulting to an overstated net income
for the period. As a result, numerous theoretical
and empirical studies had been conducted regard-
ing the possibility of earnings management with the
use of impairment. However, no study has yet been
conducted as to whether these factors apply in the
Philippine setting. Hence, this research determined
what earnings management factors affect the
impairment of tangible and intangible assets on
Philippine’s publicly listed companies for the years
2005 until 2009.
This study has three main objectives relating to
the impairment of tangible and intangible assets.
The first one is to provide evidence on whether
companies in the Philippines are managing their
earnings. Next is to determine the different factors
that affect the said impairment, other than those
included in the impairment computation. Finally,
the last objective is to determine the relationship of
management compensation, management change,
and company’s debt leverage to the impairment of
tangible and intangible assets.
The results of this study would help a vast
number of stakeholders determine the practice of
companies with regard to the impairment recogni-
tion. For the board of directors, this study would let
them know whether management tends to defer
impairment when there are bonuses or other
compensation tied up to the company’s net income.
The financial institutions, on the other hand,
would know whether companies tend to use impair-
ment recognition in order to improve their finan-
cial ratios and decrease their cost of debt. The
government, in contrast, would determine the
extent of companies presenting fraudulent financial
information.
For the accounting regulatory bodies, this study
would let them know how companies are actually
applying the rules and standards that they have est
ablished. This study would also alert investors to be
very cautious of the tendency for management to
manipulate the financial information when pro-
vided with compensation that is tied up with the
company’s reported earnings. Finally, the general
public would learn to detect companies that show
signs of earnings management using impairment
and consequently, avoid investing their funds with
the said companies.
This study covered all the listed companies in
the Philippines Stock Exchange for the years 2005
until 2009. However, companies whose stocks are
inactive in the stock market for at least one year
were eliminated from the study. Companies that
have incomplete data for some of the variables in
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the study were also totally excluded, so as to have a
balanced panel. This study used primary and
secondary data. The secondary data, which com-
prise of financial ratios, were obtained from the
Osiris database and the SEC Form 17-A of the
respective companies in the Philippine Stock
Exchange library.
The primary data, in contrast, which depict the
management compensation motive, were gathered
via telephone interview and electronic survey.
Nonetheless, for companies that do not want to
participate in the study, the needed data were
analyzed from their SEC Form 17-A. However, this
was only used as a last resort because the primary
data provided more credibility, as well as account-
ability on the part of the respondents and because
of time constraints to read all the forms. Since the
dependent variable, impairment probability, is a
dichotomous variable, it necessitates the use of a
qualitative regression model. However, in order to
make the most efficient use of the gathered data,
quantitative regression model was also used to
analyze the degree to which the different predictor
variables affect the magnitude of impairment.
This study contains some limitations that should
be remembered in the implication of its results.
First, it is important to note that the study is
limited only to the extent of the impairment for
tangible and intangible assets. Second, the research
excluded the financial statements issued by compa-
nies that have a reporting period of less than 12
months, such as those issued by companies that
changed from their respective fiscal year into
calendar year. Lastly, the samples that contain no
impairment were removed from the multiple linear
regression analysis. This arose out of the necessity
to log the impairment magnitude (dependent
variable) in order to make the amounts comparable
with the independent variables.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The different theories underlying this study are
market economy theory, prospect theory, agency
theory, and the positive accounting theory. Market
economy theory explained the cause of impairment
while the other theories addressed the earnings
mana-gement motives.
MARKET ECONOMY THEORY
The market economy theory explains that the
value of an asset is realized by future trades or
events. In other words, it is determined by the
market economy of a country. According to Sun
and Xu (2010), the market economy has two dis-
tinct characteristics: freedom and uncertainty. They
explained fr eedom as advocating free competition
among enterprise. As a result of this competition,
Lazonick (2003) added that all the participants will
be able to maximize their own benefits. On the
other hand, Sun and Xu (2010) discussed uncer-
tainty as an adjustment by the market economy
itself. They explained that the future trades or
events happening in the market economy will
definitely bring uncertain economic benefits for the
enterprise. Hence, it is highly probable that the
future economic benefit that will flow to the entity
will be lower than the book value of the asset, thus,
asset impairment occurs. As a result, the essential
characteristics of the market economy contribute to
the change in the value of the asset.
AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory explains that in order to address
the potential lack of alignment in the goals, prefer-
ences, and actions between managers and share-
holders, the company should tie the compensation
of managers with those of shareholders through
ownership or compensation (Kleiman, 2006). This
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involves giving stock options and bonuses to manag-
ers that are tied with the company’s stock price.
Shapiro (2005) provided empirical evidence that as
a result of the strong financial alignment between
the CEO and shareholders, CEOs make decisions
that increase the company’s net income or the
market value of its share. As such, management
compensation provides a particularly strong motiva-
tion for the CEO and other top management to
manipulate the earnings of the company, in order
to increase their financial well being.
POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
Positive accounting theory assumes that parties
(managers, regulators, and the com-pany itself) are
behaving opportunistically, that is, the different
parties are acting based on their own self interest or
for the increase of their own wealth (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, Watts and
Zimmerman (1990) explained that accounting
choices are made in terms of individual objectives
and the effects of the accounting methods in the
achievement of those objectives. Positive accounting
theory has three hypotheses, namely bonus plan,
debt covenant, and political cost hypotheses. The
bonus plan hypothesis is essentially the same as the
agency theory while the debt covenant hypothesis
explains that the higher the firm’s debt to equity
ratio, the more likely managers will use accounting
methods that will increase the income and prevent
the company from violating any debt covenants
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Lastly, the political
cost hypothesis, as discussed by Watts and
Zimmerman (1990), indicates that large companies
tend to recognize more impairment in order to
decrease their net income and avoid being in the
“public eye.” This would prevent the firm from
incurring additional expenses that may be imposed
by external groups upon seeing the company’s
profitability, such as demand for increase in wages
from labor unions and increase in required corpo-
rate social responsibility from the government.
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Figure 1 shows the operational framework used
in the study. The different earnings management
motives, which were discussed in the succeeding
sections and the size of each company, constitute
the predictor variables while the impairment
probability and magnitude comprise the dependent
variables. The different financial ratios used to
proxy each factor are also shown. Because a com-
pany that wanted to increase its net in come, in
order to reach a particular target, would make use
of all available means or accounting flexibility to
reach it, it is assumed that the earnings manage-
ment motives would have the same effect on the
impairment of both tangible and intangible assets.
Therefore, the analysis was consolidated for both
types of impairment.
ASSET IMPAIRMENT
Impairment is recognized when the carrying
amount of the asset exceeds its recoverable amount.
The recoverable amount is measured as the higher
between the fair value less cost to sell of the asset
and its value in use. The issue now arises in the
subjectivity of the cost to sell and computation for
value in use. Since cost to sell is oftentimes rela-
tively immaterial, there is less subjectivity involved
in this measurement. However, value in use is
computed primarily on management estimate.
Value in use is the present value of expected future
cash flows arising from the use of the asset dis-
counted using the discount rate applicable to assets
of similar risk. The controversy here is that manage-
ment may prevent the recognition of impairment by
increasing the estimate on future cash flow or by
using a low discount rate in order to achieve their
agenda. These prevent additional expenses from
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being recognized in the company’s income state-
ment, resulting to an overstated net income for the
period.
Since impairment occurs as a result of the
changing market conditions that rendered the
assets’ recoverable amount less than its book value,
the more assets a company has, the more prone it is
to impairment. As such, there is a need to measure
the relation of a firm’s assets with the impairment
decision. According to Lamm-Tennant and Rollins
(1994), there are three possible proxies for a firm’s
size: total assets, total equity, and total revenue.
Total assets, obviously, can be used to proxy the
firm’s size because the size of a firm is largely
determined by the amount of asset it owns. In
contrast, Liu and Rhee (2003) explained that total
equity shows the amount of assets “genuinely
owned” by the firm. Since the company is man-
dated to pay its debt at all cost or be forced to
bankruptcy, the portion of a company’s assets
financed by debt can be viewed as a form of “oper-
ating lease.” The company pays “rent” for those
assets in the form of interest payments and the
company is also required to “return” it in the form
of principal payment. Lastly, total revenue can also
be used to proxy for the  firm’s size because larger
firms tend to have more revenue, since they have
more assets to use in profitable operations. Al-
though most researches use total assets to proxy a
firm’s size, Lamm-Tennant and Rollins (1994)
provide empirical evidence that either of the three
can be used. Perhaps, the only reason why a total
asset is the most frequently used proxy is because
most people regard assets as the only measure for a
firm’s size.
INCOME SMOOTHING
Income smoothing is explained by Trueman and
Titman (1988) as the use of accounting techniques
to level out net income fluctuations from one
period to the next. Tucker and Zarowin (2006)
explained that in income smoothing, the series of
reported earnings would have the same average as
the series of actual economic incomes, but with
lower variability. It is important to know that
income smoothing is different from deliberate
misstatements of financial values, which would
constitute outright fraud. Rather, income smooth-
ing takes advantage on the flexibility provided in
the interpretation of GAAP.
Two primary motivations to income smoothing
is meeting the analysts’ forecast and maintaining
debt requirements. According to Athanasakou,
Strong, and Walker (2010), companies generally
indulge in this practice because investors are willing
to pay a premium for stocks with steady and predict-
able earnings’ streams, compared to stocks whose
earnings are subject to wild fluctuations. Beatty and
Weber (2003) indicated that companies also engage
in this practice in order to obtain a cheaper cost of
borrowing. According to Chong (2006), income
smoothing is not unethical if management would
use real smoothing techniques like hedging instru-
ments; but it becomes unethical if management
would use accounting discretion to smooth the
earnings or engages in the many “forms” of im-
proper timing recognition.  Nelson, Elliott, and
Tarpley (2001) gave evidence that management try
to “flatten” their net income using the impairment
decision, in order to meet the forecast or earnings’
target. They found that management recognize
impairment when their actual income is above the
expected and defer the recognition when their
actual income is below expected income. This study
focused on determining the factors that would
signal income smoothing with the use of impair-
ment decision.
“BIG BATH” ACCOUNTING
Big bath accounting is the strategy
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of manipulating a company’s reported income to
make poor results look even worse. This is often
applied when the company suffered a tremendous
loss during the year (Siggelkow and Zuelch, 2010).
Kirchenheiter and Melumad (2001) explained that
management maximizes the company’s loss by
expensing the accumulated unrecognized impair-
ment loss that resulted from income smoothing.
This would result in a one-time big loss or a “big
bath.” They stated that the reason for this practice
is because it will enable the management to reach
the analyst’s forecast easily on the succeeding years,
since there would be no more impairment loss to
recognize. Furthermore, according to Siggelkow and
Zuelch (2010), management perceives that increas-
ing the tremendous loss that the company had
already incurred for the year would have little
impact on the company and would not affect the
company’s reputation. Impairment decision is
commonly used by many companies in the United
States to smooth its income and as a ‘big bath’.
Although it is quite inconceivable for a company to
use b oth income smoothing and big bath account-
ing method, Kirchenheiter and Melumad (2001)
provided evidence of companies employing both
income smoothing and big bath accounting.
When companies engage in “big bath” account-
ing, their management or CEO often has an instant
excuse to tell the public. According to Selling
(2007), Citigroup, Inc wrote-off 8-10 billion dollars
on November, 2007 and blames it all to events that
took place in October. On the other hand, Selling
(2007) also mentioned that General Motors (GM)
Corporation reported an allowance of 39 million
dollars and then its management declared that GM
continues to believe its long term financial outlook.
This is obviously because GM anticipates having
higher profits in the future, as a result of having
recognized some of its future expenses.
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MOTIVES
Nelson et al. (2001) indicated two major earnings
management motivations, which are increasing
management compensation and meeting debt
requirement.
MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
Prior researches show that impairment decision
is used by some management to increase their
compensation. As a result of the increased aware-
ness of the people regarding agency problem, many
companies devise compensation schemes that link
the managers’ compensation to the well being of
the enterprise. This somehow solves the agency
problem; however, it provides management with an
incentive to defer the recognition of impairment, so
as to increase the company’s net income and their
compensation.
Many studies provided empirical evidence of a
significant relation between management compen-
sation and management change to impairment. The
research of Mergenthaler, Rajgopal,  and Srinivasan
(2009) provided evidence of a 6% and 10% bonus
cut in the compensation, as well as a 3% and 5%
unconditional probability of dismissal for the chief
financial officer (CFO) and chief executive officer
(CEO) respectively, as a result of failing to meet the
analysts’ forecast twice. Another study by Guan,
Wright, and Shannon (2005) found evidence that
less or no impairment is recognized during the last
full year of an outgoing CEO. On the other hand, a
similar study conducted by Wells (2002) pointed
out that a huge impairment or “a big bath” is
deliberately recognized in the transition year by the
incoming CEO. Cheng and Warfield (2005) sup-
plied evidence that impairment decision is used by
managers with high equity incentive to increase the
value of their shares. They found out that managers
want to sell their shares at the earliest time possible
in order to diversify the risk, as a result of the
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volatility of stock price. This gives the managers an
incentive to defer impairment to increase short-
term stock prices. Then the hypothesis is formu-
lated as follows:
H0: Executive compensation and management
change have no significant impact on impairment
decision and magnitude.
H1: Executive compensation and management
change have significant impact on impairment
decision and magnitude.
DEBT REQUIREMENT
The last major incentive for companies to
manage their earnings is to maintain the require-
ments of a debt coven ant. This is because breaking
a provision in a debt covenant would make most
debts demandable immediately, which will cause
most companies to suffer significant liquidity
problems. Beatty and Weber (2003) provided
evidence that companies having an existing debt
contract or bank loan tend to have less or no
impairment loss, when there are provisions that tie
the variable interest rate to the performance of the
company or restrict dividend payment subject to
certain performance measures.
Beneish and Press (1993) depicted evidence that
lenders of firms under technical default have an
increase control over the firm’s activities and
exercise various contractual rights, such as imposing
refinancing and restructuring costs on violators.
They explained that refinancing costs arise because
most lenders raise the interest rates on loans
following violation. The same study also furnished
proof of companies losing their profitable invest-
ments by modifying their operations, in order to
meet the lender’s repayment demands. Moreover, it
provided evidence that violations are less costly for
firms that can obtain a waiver than for those that
cannot. However, the waivers are costly, since
lenders extract fees and concessions in exchange for
granting them (Beneish and Press, 1993). Hence,
breaking a debt provision can result in the incur-
rence of a substantial amount of cost. Therefore,
most companies would choose to manage their
earnings in order to avoid reaching technical
default. Then the hypothesis is formulated as
follows:
H0: Debt to total assets ratio has no significant
impact on impairment decision and magnitude.
H2: Debt to total assets ratio has significant impact
on impairment decision and magnitude.
FIRM SIZE
In some previous studies (e.g. Chunguang, 2006;
Xin, 2008; Fang-fei, 2008) found that some of the
characteristics of the company have effect on
earnings management, particularly in the form of
asset impairment. Based on these arguments, the
last hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H0: Total assets, total revenue, and total equity have
no significant impact on impairment decision and
magnitude.
H3: Total assets, total revenue, and total equity have
significant impact on impairment decision and
magnitude.
METHOD
RESEARCH DESIGN
This study is considered a causal and correla-
tional research, which aimed to determine the
relationship of the different earnings management
factors to the impairment decision. It is both a
quantitative and qualitative study that measured
the effects of the earnings management motives
(independent variables) to the impairment probabil-
ity and impairment magnitude (dependent vari-
ables). Being a causal research, it determined
whether the impairment decision is caused by the
variables that indicate earnings management. As a
correlational research, the study sought to know the
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relationship of the earnings management motiva-
tions to the impairment decision. Besides knowing
the relationship, this study also obtained an esti-
mate of the possible impact that each of the inde-
pendent variable had on the impairment loss. The
earnings management variables would reflect the
different motives that may cause the comp any to
use the impairment decision to manage their
earnings.
FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
POPULATION AND RESPONDENTS
The population of the study is comprised of all
the listed companies in the Philippines Stock
Exchange for the years 2005-2009. This study
excluded companies that have inactive stocks, as
well as those companies that lack some data on
particular variables. Companies are classified to
have an inactive stock if the market value of its
shares did not fluctuate for at least one whole year.
The year 2005 is the starting period because it is
at this year when most companies initially adapted
the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). This study covered companies from the
different sectors of the economy namely, financial
sector, industrial sector, holding firms, property
sector, service sector and mining and oil sector.
Overall, there are 251 listed companies in the
Philippine Stock Exchange.
METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS
This study used two statistical tools to analyze
the data namely, probit regression model and
multiple linear regression model. However, since
the study used panel data, the appropriate panel
analysis was also executed. Both the probit regres-
sion and the multiple linear regression addressed all
the objectives and used the same independent
variables. However, differences arise in the tested
hypothesis. The probit regression tested the effect
of the predictor variables on the probability of
recognizing an impairment loss. On the other
hand, the multiple linear regressions tested the
effect of the predictor variables on the magnitude
of impairment loss recognized.
PROBIT REGRESSION MODEL
 (1)
In the above equation, the predicted variable,
IMP
it
, is a binary variable that takes the value of 1,
granted that company  recognizes an impairment
loss in period t and 0 if it did not while the remain-
ing variables are all predictor variables. OCF
ct
represents the operating cash flows divided by the
total assets while EBITDA
 ct
 is the earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
divided by total assets. MBR
ct
 stands for company
c’s market to book ratio in period t. EC
 ct 
and MC
 ct
,
which are both indicator variables, are used to
signify whether the company provides bonuses that
are affected by impairment loss and whether a
change in top management occurred in a given
year, respectively. DTA
 ct
 is the company’s debt to
assets ratio while ROA 
ct
 depicts the company’s
return on total assets ratio.  Parallel to the study of
Lamm-Tennant and Rollins (1994), the total rev-
enues, total assets, and stockholders’ equity were
used to proxy a firm’s size. REVENUE
ct
 was mea-
sured as the log of the total revenue. ASSETS
ct, 
on
the other hand, was measured as the log of the total
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assets. Lastly, EQUITYct was measured as the log of
the company’s stockholders’ equity. Similar to the
study of Siggelkow and Zuelch (2010), the earnings
management indicator was used to proxy for big
bath accounting. This indicator was calculated
using the following formula:
 (2)
BIGBATH ct proxies for big bath accounting and
equals the earnings management indicator if this
falls below zero and 0 otherwise.
Multiple Linear Regression Model
 (3)
The multiple linear regression model contains
essentially the same variables as the probit regres-
sion model, except for the endogenous variable.
The dependent variable, IMMct, signifies the degree
of impairment or the actual amount of impairment
recognized by the company in a given year, rather
than being simply a dichotomous variable, as in the
probit regression.
PANEL ANALYSIS
Since panel data was used in the study, the
appropriate panel analysis was conducted. Panel
analysis is composed of a series of steps to deter-
mine, which among three models namely, the
ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model
(FEM) or least squares dummy variables (LSDV),
and the random effects model (REM) was most
appropriate for the research. The test of overall
significance of dummies was conducted to find out
which among the three variations of FEM, LSDV1,
LSDV2 and LSDV3, would be most proper to
represent FEM. Afterwards, Wald Test was con-
ducted to decide whether the chosen LSDV model
or OLS would be the better model. The said test
was performed manually using certain data from
both the OLS and the LSDV model, as well as the
formula below.
In the said test, if the f-statistics is greater than
the critical f-value, then FEM is presumed to be the
better model. Otherwise, OLS would be the pre-
ferred model. Since the result, as shown below,
displays OLS as the better model, Breusch-Pagan
lagrangian multiplier test was subsequently adminis-
tered to compare OLS and REM. If the p-value in
the said test is less than 0.05, REM would be the
accepted model, otherwise, OLS would be the
superior model. The result of the panel analysis as
depicted below, shows OLS as the most appropriate
model for the data. According to Gujarati (2004),
pooled regression (or OLS) allows greater flexibility
in modeling differences in sample specific behavior.
Although it does not account for the cross sectional
relationships, sometimes no significant relation-
ships among the cross-sectional observations exist,
as in the case of this study. In addition, in terms of
parsimony, it is always easier to analyze and under-
stand the results of a more basic model. As such,
the OLS model or the naïve model is used in the
study.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Some of the variables are “log,” in order to have
more comparable values  with the other indepen-
dent variable. These variables are LOGIMM,
LOGASSETS, LOGREVENUE, and
LOGEQUITY. IMM, which is a dependent vari-
able, is the gross impairment actually recognized by
the company.  As will be shown in the following
section, the average of IMM variable is tremen-
dously large, compared to all the independent
variables. Hence, in order to have a more meaning-
ful result, the IMM variable was “log” with the
resultant shown in the LOGIMM variable.
This resulted to all the firm years that have no or
zero impairment getting removed. Hence, the 179
observations in LOGIMM represent firm years that
contained a recorded impairment loss on the
tangible or intangible assets. The LOGASSETS,
LOGREVENUE, and LOGEQUITY, as discussed
in the methodo-logy, are the log of assets, revenue
and equity, respectively. There is the necessity to log
these values because of their tremendous size,
which can distort the results. The firm years con-
taining no or zero revenue are removed, resulting to
768 observations for the LOGREVENUE variable.
The same thing happened to LOGEQUITY, where
the firm years containing zero or negative share-
holders’ equity (deficit) are removed, resulting to
786 observations for the said variable.
About 57% of the companies recognized an
impairment loss within the period 2005 until 2009.
However, if counted based on firm years, there are
only about 22% of the total firm years that contain
impairment. This percentage is actually the mean of
the impairment probability variable because the
only inputs for this variable are 0 and1. The average
impairment loss based on firm years, including the
ones that did not contain any impairment totaled P
44,000,000. The smallest input for the IMM
variable is logically 0 because of firm years that
contain no impairment while the largest amount is
P 4,760,000,000. LOGIMM, in contrast to IMM,
has an average of 16.92 and a maximum value of
22.28. This clearly shows the huge difference in the
amount of IMM, as a result of getting log. The
minimum value of 9.62 represents the log of the
smallest impairment loss recognized in one
firmyear.
This section discusses the descriptive statistics
for the independ ent variables. The executive
compensation, which is composed of only 0’s and
1’s values, has an average of 0.45. On the contrary,
the management change variable, which is also a
dummy variable, has an average of 0.28.
TABEL 1.DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE FIRMS
The debt to assets ratio has an average of 0.59
with the smallest amount at 0, indicating no debt,
and the highest amount at 8.64. The debt to asset
ratios that are higher than 1, especially the 8.64,
shows firm years where the total liabilities of the
firm are more than its total assets, as in the case
when the firm has a negative shareholders’ equity.
BIGBATH provided an average value of -1.00,
which indicates that despite the lowest data under
BIGBATH depicting a value of -302.16, majority of
the amounts are close to -1.00. Finally, the
LOGASSETS, LOGREVENUE and LOGEQUITY
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have an average of 15.16, 13.52 and 14.55, respec-
tively.
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Correlation analysis was done separately for
probit and multiple linear regression because
STATA removed all the results for the IMP variable,
which is the dependent variable for probit regres-
sion. This is actually shown in the correlation
analysis for multiple linear regressions (the second
correlation table). The treatment of STATA may
actually be attributed to the possible effect of the
LOGIMM variable to the IMP variable. Recall that
the IMP variable has the value of 1 when there is
impairment and 0 when none. However, since the
log of IMM removed all the observations with a
zero IMM (no impairment loss), this means that all
the remaining values left for IMP are 1’s. As a
result, Stata removed the IMP variable because it
has no correlation with any of the other variables.
This inference was actually proven on the first
correlation table where the same independent
variables are used, but the dependent variable for
multiple linear regressions, LOGIMM, is removed.
The IMM, which is the actual impairment, was also
removed in the correlation table for probit regres-
sion because it is only relevant in relation to
LOGIMM.
Many of the independent variables that were
used in the probit regression exhibited an insignifi-
cant correlation with each other and the dependent
variable, although some did show significant
relation with the other independent variables.  The
earnings management indicator and big bath
accounting indicator showed a negative correlation
with impairment probability while the others
exhibited positive correlation. However, judging
from their coefficients, all of the independent
variables signified a weak or possibly no correlation
with the impairment probability variable, since
none of their coefficients exceeded 0.25. Similar to
their relation with the impairment probability, both
TABLE 2.THE PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE VARIABLES ANALYZED FOR PROBIT REGRESSION
TABLE 3.THE PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE VARIABLES ANALYZED FOR MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION
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the big bath accounting indicator and management
change depicted a weak or poor correlation in
relation to all other independent variables.
The remaining independent variables exhibited
some significant relation with each other. The
earnings-based bonus payment indicator exhibited a
moderately positive correlation with the debt to
assets ratio, total assets, total revenue and total
equity while the debt to assets ratio is also moder-
ately correlated with the total assets and total
revenue. Finally, the total assets, total revenue and
total equity are all moderately to highly correlated
with each other.
Unlike the correlations under probit regression,
more variables exhibited a moderate to high degree
of correlation with the predicted variable and the
other exogenous variables under multiple linear
regressions. The dependent variable, LOGIMM,
depicted a moderately positive correlation with the
gross impairment, management change, total assets,
total revenue and total equity. This shows that
although LOGIMM is simply the log of the gross
impairment, its correlation with it is quite low. The
other independent variables also exhibited some
moderate to high correlation with the other inde-
pendent variables. The earnings-based bonus
payment and the debt to assets ratio both have a
moderately positive correlation with total assets,
total revenue and total equity. Lastly, similar to the
results for the correlation analysis on the variables
for probit regression, the total assets, total equity
and total revenue are all moderately to highly
correlated with each other.
TABLE 4.PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS
TABLE 5.LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS
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PROBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The probit regression result is shown in Table 4
and logit regression result is shown in Table 5.
Big Bath Accounting Indicator (BIGBATH) with
Impairment Decision as Dependent Variable
Big bath accounting indicator conveyed a insig-
nificant relation with the impairment decision.
This is contrary to the expectation beforehand and
to the findings of Kirchenheiter and Melumad
(2001), but consistent with the empirical researches
of Siggelkow and Zuelch (2010) and Athanasakou et
al. (2010). The apriori expectation provides a
positive relation, since, as explained by Kirchenhei-
ter and Melumad (2001), companies often engage
in big bath accounting in order to recognize the
accumulated deferred impairment that results from
consistently having earnings that are just below the
analysts’ forecast. In other words, big bath account-
ing is the by product of income smoothing.
The resulting insignificant relation between the
two variables denotes that management does not
engage in “big bath” accounting with the use of the
impairment decision. This may, perhaps, be the
result of management’s awareness of the conse-
quences of pursuing a “big bath,” such as bad
publicity and forced re-statement of all prior year
financial statements to correct the “mistake” by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Earnings-based Bonus Payment Indicator (EC) with
Impairment Decision as Dependent Variable
The earnings-based bonus payment indicator,
otherwise called executive compen-sation indicator,
showed an insignificant relation to the impairment
decision.  This result is in conflict with the prior
expectation and the study of Beatty and Weber
(2003) and Guan et al. (2005), but consistent with
the findings of Siggelkow and Zuelch (2010). The
previous expectation, which was based on the study
of Beatty and Weber (2003), is that companies that
provide bonus plans and do not exclude impair-
ment reduce the impairment probability because
management is trying to improve the reported
earnings of the company, so as to obtain a higher
bonus. This explanation is also in conformity with
the agency theory discussed by Kleiman (2006) and
Shapiro (2005).
The most compelling reason that can be attrib-
uted to this finding is that employees are often
reluctant to ask for the help of their co-worker in
perpetrating fraud. However, the result may also
imply that the compensation scheme actually works
in boosting the performance of the company and
does not incite the employees to engage in earnings
management.
Management Change Indicator (MC) with Impair-
ment Decision as Dependent Variable
The management change indicator also exhib-
ited an insignificant relation with the impairment
decision. This result is opposed to the prior expec-
tation and to the findings of Cheng and Warfield
(2005), Wells (2002), and Guan et al. (2005), but
consistent with the study of Siggelkow and Zuelch
(2010) and Lamm-Tennant and Rollins (1994). It is
expected that a change in the company executives
would have a higher impairment probability be-
cause the new executive has the incentive to recog-
nize all discretionary expenses, in order to get rid of
them and blame the old management for the low
profit during the year of change. The insignificant
relation implies that the company recognizes
impairment, notwith-standing whether a change in
the top management occurs. However, when a
change in top management occur, the amount of
impairment recognized may be larger than usual. As
such, the effect of management change may be
clearer when the actual amount of impairment is
taken into account.
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Debt to Total Assets Ratio (DTA) with Impairment
Decision as Dependent Variable
The debt to total assets ratio denoted a signifi-
cant positive relation with the impairment decision,
as manifested by its p-value of 0.03, which rendered
the variable significant at á equals 0.05. This result
is again in contrast to previous expectation, as well
as the research of Beneish and Press (1993) and
Beatty and Weber (2003). It is, however, consistent
with the study of Dichev and Skinner (2001). The
prior expectation is that the higher the leverage, the
lower the impairment probability because manage-
ment of firms approaching technical default would
tend to make income increasing accounting deci-
sions (Beneish and Press, 1993; Watts and
Zimmerman, 1990). The most explicit implication
of this result is that companies that already have
high debt to assets ratio may already be incapable of
obtaining a loan at a reasonable price; hence, they
do not have an incentive to defer the recognition of
impairment. On the other hand, fin ancially strong
companies would defer the recognition of impair-
ment in order to have a high net income and low
debt to assets ratio. This would, in turn, decrease
their perceived risk and allow them to obtain
cheaper cost of debt.
Total Revenue (REVENUE) with Impairment Deci-
sion as Dependent Variable
Although the probit regression results indicated
an insignificant p-value, the results from the logit
regression displayed the total revenue as having
suggestive evidence of a negative relation.  The total
revenue would be considered as having suggestive
evidence because it may actually provide some
valuable information that rendered it significant in
the logit regression result. The finding, however, is
inconsistent with the prior expectation and with
the study of Siggelkow and Zuelch (2010) and
Lamm- Tennant and Rollins (1994) while consistent
with the research of Liu and Rhee (2003).
The expected relation is positive because the
larger a company, the more assets it has that are
prone to impairment. In addition, the political cost
hypothesis also discusses that large companies tend
to choose income-decreasing accounting choices in
order to avoid exposure to political scrutiny (Watts
and Zimmerman, 2010). Although initially intended
to proxy for firm size, the total revenue can also be
used to proxy the pattern exhibited by the net
income because of its direct relation. As a result,
the negative relationship of total revenue and the
impairment decision implies suggestive evidence
that companies are using the impairment decision
to engage in small “big bath” accounting. According
to Siggelkow and Zuelch (2010), “big bath” account-
ing is often practiced by recognizing impairment
when the net income of the company is low so that
the future earnings will be higher. It is important to
emphasize that what is referred here is “small ‘big
bath’ accounting.” This is the practice of recogniz-
ing a “big bath” only to the extent where it will not
raise public attention because of the extremely low
earnings.
Total Equity (EQUITY) with Impairment Decision as
Dependent Variable
Total equity exhibited a highly significant posi-
tive relation with the impairment decision, as
displayed by its p-value. The result is consistent with
prior expectation, as well as the findings in prior
researches, such as Athanasakou et al. (2010) and
Liu and Rhee (2003). Kasznik and McNichols
(2002), however, found no significant relation
between the total equity and impairment. The
significant positive relation provides evidence in
support of the market economy theory, where
larger firms tend to have more impairment because
of changes in market condition.
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Panel Analysis for Multiple Linear Regression
The results of the panel analysis indicated that
OLS or the naïve model would be the appropriate
model for the study. The first test that was con-
ducted, the test of overall significance of dummies,
indicated LSDV2 as having the highest f-value or
the lowest p-value. Consequently, LSDV2 was the
model used to represent FEM for the Wald’s test.
The next test, the Wald’s test, was conducted to
determine whether OLS or FEM is the better
model for the data. The results revealed an f-
statistics of 2.17 while a critical f-value is 2.43. Since
the f-statistics is less than the critical f-value, OLS is
concluded to be the better model. Finally, the last
test that was conducted, the Breusch and Pagan
Lagrangian multiplier test, examined whether OLS
or REM is the more appropriate model. The result
revealed a p-value of 0.65, which implies that OLS
is the better model. Hence, OLS is the model used
for the multiple linear regression analysis.
FIGURE 2. DIAGRAM OF THE PANEL ANALYSIS
TABLE 6.MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS
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Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
The Multiple Linear Regression Results is shown
in Table 6. Big Bath Accounting Indicator (BIG-
BATH)  with Impairment Magnitude as Dependent
Variable
As opposed to the result in the probit regression,
big bath ac counting indicator conveyed a positive
relation with the impairment magnitude, as shown
by its p-value of 0.03. The coefficient of BIGBATH
may mislead some readers into thinking that big
bath accounting imposes a negative relation. Re-
member, big bath accounting indicator is composed
of all the negative amounts of the earnings manage-
ment indicator. Hence, an increase in the value of
BIGBATH would result to a further negative value,
which means that the true relation of BIGBATH to
impairment magnitude is the opposite of the sign
of its coefficient. This finding is in contrast to the
anticipated relation, as well as to the empirical
researches of Nelson et al. (2001) and Lamm-
Tennant and Rollins (1994). It is, however, consis-
tent to the findings of Kirchenheiter and Melumad
(2001) and Yuan (2008).
Consistent with the result of Yuan (2008), both
the management change and the big bath account-
ing indicator showed a consistent positive effect on
the impairment. This implies that most “big bath”
happens during periods where a change in top
management occurs. Usually, the practice of “big
bath” accounting places a company in the public’s
eye and creates a bad reputation. As a result, mana-
gement may have decided to “chop” the recognition
of the impairment, in such a way that the investors
or the public would not notice its effect on net
income. This implication is evidenced both by the
finding of this study and the “few” accounting
scandals that are heard.
Earnings-based Bonus Payment Indicator (EC) with
Impairment Magnitude as Dependent Variable
The earnings-based bonus payment indicator
portrayed an insignificant relation with the impair-
ment magnitude, as shown by the insignificant p-
value. This is contrary to the apriori expectation,
where having bonuses given to executives would
result to less impairment (Beatty and Weber, 2003).
It is also in conflict with the researches of Beatty
and Weber (2003), Lamm-Tennant and Rollins
(1994) and Mergenthaler et al. (2009), but consis-
tent with the findings of Guan et al. (2005) and
Siggelkow and Zuelch (2010). As in the probit
analysis, the insignificant relation may be attributed
to either more effective compensation plans given
by the board of directors to its executive officers or
the result of the many deterrents to fraud.
Management Change Indicator (MC) with Impair-
ment Magnitude as Dependent Variable
The management change indicator demon-
strated suggestive evidence of a significant positive
relation to the impairment magnitude, as provided
by its p-value of 0.06, which is significant at á equals
0.05. This result is consistent with the findings of
Yuan (2008) and Ronen and Yaari (2008). This
finding, coupled with the result of the big bath
accounting indicator, implies the practice of “big
bath” accounting during periods where changes in
top management occur. Hence, these findings
supplied evidence that most “big bath” occur when
there is a change in top management.
Debt to Total Assets Ratio (DTA) with Impairment
Magnitude as Dependent Variable
Contrary to the expectation beforehand, the
debt to assets ratio provided no significant relation
to the magnitude of impairment recognized, as
portrayed by its insignificant p-value. This is consis-
tent with the findings of Lamm-Tennant and
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Rollins (1994) but inconsistent wi th the result of
Beatty and Weber (2003). The apriori expectation,
as explained by Beatty and Weber (2003), is that
companies trying to obtain a loan would tend to
have smaller amounts of impairment rather than
other companies. On the contrary, the implication
of having a debt to assets ratio that is insignificant
as to the impairment magnitude while significant
with regard to the impairment decision is that
companies are trying to show their “best face”
forward. This means that it recognizes no impair-
ment at all when contracting for a lower cost of
borrowing or when it has any other motives tied up
with debt financing. Since the cost of borrowing is
largely tied up with how risky the bank sees the
company, the company could actually save a lot of
money in the form of decreased interest expense by
showing an excellent financial values. As a result,
the debt to assets ratio has no affect on the magni-
tude of impairment recognized by the company.
Total Revenue (REVENUE) with Impairment Magni-
tude as Dependent Variable
Unlike in the probit regression result, total
revenue manifested no relation with regard to the
impairment magnitude, as evidenced by its insig-
nificant p-value. This finding is consistent with
several studies, like that of Lamm-Tennant and
Rollins (1994), Lee (2007) and Martinez and Reis
(2010).  The expected relation is positive, since total
revenue was intended to proxy for firm size. Accord-
ing to Liu and Rhee (2003), larger firms tend to
have higher amounts of revenue because of their
increased market presence and market operations,
which made total revenue a good proxy for firm
size. The insignificant relation may have been the
result of the total revenue being an income state-
ment item. Although the total revenue was initially
intended to proxy for the firm size, it can also be
used to proxy the trend exhibited by the net income
because it generally has a positive correlation with
net income. Hence, the nature of revenue as an
income statement item and the direct positive effect
of revenue to net income are the causes that pre-
vent total revenue from being an effective proxy for
the firm size.
Total Equity (EQUITY) with Impairment Magnitude
as Dependent Variable
The total equity indicated a highly significant
positive relation with the impairment magnitude, as
presented by the p-value of 0.000, which is signifi-
cant at á equals 0.01. Prior researches, such as the
study of Liu and Rhee (2003) and Mergenthaler et
al. (2009), indicated similar results while Ronen
and Yaari (2008) cited some researches indicating
no relation. The positive relation between total
equity and the impairment magnitude simply
reinforced the apriori expectation and the notion
that the larger a firm, the more impairment it is
likely to recognize. This is not surprising because of
the natural tendency for the value of an asset to go
down, as a result of economic obsolescence and
physical damage. As such, the result of this study
provided further empirical evidence in support of
the market economy theory.
CONCLUSION
The study investigated the presence of any
significant relationship between the different
motives to earnings management and the impair-
ment decision and magnitude. Under the market
economy theory, Sun and X u (2010) discussed that
the freedom of competition among enterprise and
the inherent uncertainty of events in the market
will cause an asset to become impaired. However,
management also has its own reasons for the
impairment.
The practice of “big bath” accounting occurs
more frequently when there is a change in the
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executive officers or top management of the com-
pany while executive bonuses have no relation to
the impairment decision or its magnitude. Out of
the two variables designed to test the management’s
personal motive, the management change indicator
provided significant relation with the magnitude of
impairment recognized while the executive compen-
sation provided no relation. Yuan (2008) expresses
that “big bath” accounting frequently occurs when
there is a change in the top executive of the firm.
The management change and the “big bath” ac-
counting indicator showed a parallel effect on the
impairment magnitude, which signify evidence in
support of Yuan’s (2008) claim.
Another finding of this study is that financially
strong companies are deferring the recognition of
impairment when it is tied up with its cost of debt.
The significant positive relation of the debt to assets
ratio or leverage with the impairment decision
shows that financially strong companies are usually
the ones deferring the recognition of impairment in
order to have a smaller interest cost. This is because
low debt to assets ratio is attributed to low probabil-
ity of impairment. On the other hand, financially
troubled companies may not expect to obtain a loan
at a reasonable interest. As such, they do not have
any incentive to defer the recognition of impair-
ment, which explains why higher debt to assets
ratios is accompanied with more impairment.
Since companies are not only “forced” to have a
high net income in order to meet the analysts’
forecast, but they are also pressured to avoid or
minimize political costs, management may decide
to simply “smooth” earnings. This is assuming that
the true implication of the positive relation between
firm size and impairment is in accordance with the
political cost theory. Income smoothing will pre-
vent the company from recognizing huge net
income that may lead to political costs, but satisfy
the pressures of the stockholders of meeting the
analysts’ forecast. As such, it is not surprising if
companies nowadays are engaging in income
smoothing, as indicated by many independent
variables.
The findings of the study would enable the
following stakeholders to determine the accounting
practices of publicly listed companies with regard to
impairment, in order to react accordingly. First, for
Board of Directors, since most “big bath” account-
ing happens during the years where changes in
management occur, the board of directors should
ask for the joint preparation of the financial state-
ments for the period of the last regular financial
statement to the period of change. This would
avoid the “blaming game,” where each party accuses
the other for the bad results of the company’s
operation during the transition year.
Since the old management has an incentive to
defer impairment, so as to show that the company
was very profitable during their administration
while the new management would want to recog-
nize the deferred expenses, as well as some future
expenses in order to increase the company’s future
income, a joint preparation of the financial state-
ments would somehow balance the two endpoints
and thereby show the actual values. In addit ion,
the board of directors should also compel the new
management to examine or audit the last financial
statements prepared by the old management one
month prior to transition. This method would not
only reveal whether the old management deferred
impairment but it will also prevent the new man-
agement from making biased accusations regarding
the accounting practice of the old management.
Second, financial institutions should require the
companies applying for a loan to have their assets
evaluated by an independent appraiser. This would
enable the banks to find out whether the recover-
able amount used by the management is signifi-
cantly different from the market value of the assets.
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In which case, these may signal possible deferring of
impairment. In addition, banks and other financial
institutions should not become complacent with
the figures reported to them by financially healthy
companies because findings indicate that these
companies are the ones more likely to defer the
recognition of impairment. According to Davis et
al. (2009), deferring impairment would increase the
companies’ net income and make them appear less
risky than they truly are, which would decrease the
company’s cost of debt. Therefore, banks and other
financial institutions should be skeptic in assessing
the riskiness even of financially healthy firms.
Third, The government may choose to imple-
ment heavy punishments on companies that were
caught to practice earnings management, in order
to protect other organizations and its citizens from
being deceived. These punishments may include
imposing heavy fines on the company and impris-
oning the people who were found guilty of such act.
The heavy fines would cause the management to
assess whether the benefit of taking advantage of
impairment would outweigh the risk of being
caught and fined, as well as the possible disruption
on the company’s reputation. On the other hand,
imprisonment would make management think
twice whether they are willing to risk their personal
lives for the “benefit” of the company. Hence,
imposing both penalties and imprisonment would
serve to create two deterrents, one to the company
and another to its management.
Fourth, The accounting regulatory body should
consider the possibility of removing the value in use
alternative in determining impairment, since this
tolerates earning management. If the recoverable
amount would be based solely on the fair value of
the asset, this would somehow limit management’s
ability to influence the amount and timing of
impairment, since impairment would be tied to the
appraiser’s evaluation. Therefore, management’s
capacity to block impairment by claiming that the
value in use is higher than the fair market value
would be removed. Hence, the auditors can have an
objective and independent basis to check whether
impairment is necessary, as well as whether the
magnitude of impairment is appropriate.
Fifth, The investors should rely more on the net
cash flows provided by operating activities in
ascertaining the profitability of the company, rather
than on the reported earnings. This is because the
operating cash flows shows the operating income of
the company, excluding the non-cash expenses. In
addition, it is this non-cash expenses that actually
provide room for earnings management. However,
this does not mean that investors should ignore the
company’s net income, since the non-cash expenses
conside red in the reported earnings, such as
depreciation, amortization, and impairment loss,
represent actual and legitimate expenditures of the
company. As such, investors and stockholders
should base the company’s result of operations both
on the net cash flows provided by operating activi-
ties and the net income reported in the income
statement, but putting more weight on the former
because of its less management subjectivity.
Sixth, for researchers, although this study pro-
vided some interesting results, it still propels several
opportunities for further research, especially with
regard to addressing the limitations of the study.
Even if the study covered the entire Philippine’s
publicly listed companies, it is important to note
that the research is limited only to the impairment
of tangible and intangible assets. As such, the
findings do not apply to other parts of the financial
statements that are subject to management discre-
tion. As a result, future researches may attempt to
determine whether the primary earnings manage-
ment motives also apply to other areas of the
financial statements. Since the multiple linear
regression model produced an r-squared of only
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40%, another area for further research is to figure
out the other factors that comprise 60% of the
model. These variables may be attributed to the
other earnings management motives that were not
covered by this study.
Finally, general public should be aware of the
companies’ practice of “big bath” accounting and
avoid engaging in transactions with such companies
alleged or proven to engage in the said practice.
There is a high probability that companies engaging
in earnings management are also practicing other
forms of manipulations and unethical acts. As such,
it would be difficult for the public to determine the
“true” financial condition and stability of the said
company, which puts doubt on the company’s
ability to continue its operations and to honor its
warranties and commitments in the products and
services it offers.
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